Surrounded by the Arabian Sea in the west, the Bay of Bengal in the east, and the Indian Ocean to the south, with a 7,500-km coastline spread across nine states and four Union territories, 1,197 islands on all fronts, more than two million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and 13 major and almost 190 minor ports, India is an active coastal nation with vital economic and security interests linked to the seas. Constituted in 1978, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG/the force), working in tandem with the Indian Navy, is primarily a defensive security establishment. It is tasked with maritime and coastal security, environmental protection (including oil spill management), EEZ patrolling, provision of security and other assistance to scientific and commercial infrastructure and expeditions, search and rescue, and other certain national defense related roles such as anti-smuggling and anti-piracy. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks, which emanated from the seas, highlighted serious deficiencies in India’s coastal security mechanism, especially ICG’s readiness and existing infrastructure. As a result, the force is being significantly expanded and upgraded with the intention of becoming one of the largest water protection forces by 2018. Despite increased budgetary allocations and acquisition of high tech infrastructure, ICG still demonstrates an inability to thoroughly secure India against its many threats. Persistent ineffectiveness coupled with a dismal implementation have caused controversy and ignited calls for substantial reforms.

The Indian Coast Guard’s genesis was a response to the rampant smuggling (from the Gulf) prevalent on India’s western coast in the 1960’s. The Central Board of Excise & Customs relied on the Indian Navy’s inadequate resources to counter smugglers. This inability to thwart smuggling was a result of a huge coastline without any effective defensive measures in place; prevalence of fishing near the coast, which made it almost impossible to detect and recognize smugglers; need to intercept boats in Indian territorial waters; and high-speed maneuverable boats used by the smugglers. Aware of these limitations, the Indian Navy requested the government to set up “an auxiliary service for maritime law enforcement and to undertake safety and security tasks in the Indian Waters.”

To craft a comprehensive response to this smuggling menace, the Prime Minister’s Office directed the Cabinet Secretariat to take appropriate steps. In January 1970, a committee under the leadership of Dr. Nag Chaudhry (Nag Chaudhri Committee) was established to “examine and report on:

• Number and nature of craft to be acquired to meet the immediate requirements of anti-smuggling task.
• Sources of supply and their availability in the world market to meet the operational requirement.
• Suitability of hovercraft, helicopter and other aircraft for anti-smuggling operations.”

The committee’s report, published in 1971, observed an “immediate need to build India’s anti-smuggling capabilities.” This primarily meant the acquisition of suitable infrastructure, primarily boats. It recommended a three-tier approach based on “indigenous construction and early acquisition of surface craft[s].” It additionally recommended the creation of a dedicated force to counter smuggling.

While plans for acquisition of boats and other material were put in place soon after the publication of committee’s report, it was not till 1974 that the Indian government seriously considered a proposal to establish the Coast Guard. In a note to the cabinet secretary, the defense secretary highlighted the need for an organization that could ensure “the safety of life and property at sea and for law enforcement in [Indian] waters.” Within the naval community, it was “considered desirable that these law enforcement responsibilities should be undertaken by a service suitably equipped and modeled on the Coast Guards of advanced nations” like the United States and the United Kingdom, “leaving the Navy to exercise the fleet for its wartime role.” Not only would using the Navy for law enforcement and search and rescue (SAR) tasks deviate it from its operational mandate, it also was not considered cost-effective to use naval vehicles, infrastructure, and weapons.

In September 1974, the Committee of Secretaries appointed a committee under the leadership of KF Rustamji (the Rustamji Committee) to study India’s counter-smuggling strengths and weaknesses and “suggest measures to protect India’s marine resources and creation of the Coast Guard.” The committee’s report, presented in July 1975, recommended the creation of a separate coast guard organization under the purview of the Ministry of Defense. After further consideration and debate this particular recommendation was accepted by the Committee of Secretaries in January 1976.

In response to this decision, Ministry of Defense officials submitted a proposal to the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) outlining the required actions and plan for setting up the Coast Guard. In January 1977, the Cabinet approved the ministry’s plan for the creation of a pilot Coast Guard organization within the Indian Navy. Along with this decision, it also directed the Officer on Special Duty (OSD) to create a comprehensive plan for the establishment of an autonomous Coast Guard. It should also be noted that in accordance with the consensus reached during the Third United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), India was entitled to an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from its shores. As a result, India acquired an area of 2.01 million square kilometers from which it could exploit natural resources. This development created a further need for maritime force that could patrol and protect these waters.

The interim Coast Guard under the Navy came into existence in February 1977. Around that time, Navy Vice Admiral VA Kamath, OSD, began working on a plan to develop an autonomous Indian Coast Guard. This plan was presented to the CCPA in July 1978. The plan was approved and in August 1978 the Coast Guard Act, 1978 was enacted, bringing into existence the ICG.

At its inception, it was realized that the force would require constant upgrade and modernization to allow it to perform its mandated duties. The earliest attempt at bringing the force up to speed was the preparation of the Coast Guard Development Plan (CGDP) 1978-1990 by the Coast Guard Advisory Board. In May 1982, an aviation wing was introduced. CGDP 1978-1990 was later changed to the 15-year Coast Guard Perspective Plan 1985-2000 in 1987. The Perspective Plan would be chopped off into blocks of five-year ‘Development Plans.’ Lack of budgetary resources prevented the CGDP 1985-1990 from being approved. CGDP 1992-1997 and CGDP 1997-2002 received only about half of their required funding. This resulted in a shortage of manpower as well as a lack of modern and reliable infrastructure, thereby weakening the ICG.

In light of the 1992 Mumbai bomb blast, ICG initiated Operation Swan “to enhance coastal security” and patrol the western coast. The approval of CGDP 2002-2007 attempted to mitigate some of the earlier shortcomings. However in November 2008, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks demonstrated that the Coast Guard was not up to task of protecting India’s coasts. Considered one of the darker moments in ICG history, it resulted in an increased in funding for the CGDP 2007-2012.

Headquartered in New Delhi, ICG is headed by a director general (rank of vice admiral in the Indian Navy). The force is divided into five geographic regions, each with their own regional headquarters – West, East, Northeast, Northwest, and Andaman & Nicobar. Each region, headed by a regional commander, is divided into district commands, with a total of 12 district headquarters throughout nine coastal states and four Union territories. Major operating units, within and independent of district commands, include coast guard stations, coast guard air stations and aviation units, and other units.

ICG is broadly responsible for the security of the Maritime Zones of India (MZI). MZI includes India’s Territorial Waters (12 nautical miles from the base line), Contiguous Zone (24 miles from the base line), and the EEZ (200 nautical miles from the baselines). The Coast Guard Act of 1978 provided an extensive mandate and prescribes specific duties to the organization. These are: protection of any commercial infrastructure, including artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations, and other structures; protecting and assisting fishermen; maritime environmental protection; law enforcement in the MZI to facilitate shipping, and control poaching, smuggling, and narcotics; assisting customs and other organizations in anti-smuggling operations; and assistance in other matters as directed, such as search and rescue operations and assistance in scientific endeavors. In the decades since the creation of the organization, the security environment in which the ICG operates has evolved and changed related and additional duties include coastal security, EEZ patrolling for protection of offshore natural resources, continuous patrolling of the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL), anti-piracy operations, and maritime pollution control. In addition to its primarily defensive role, ICG is expected to back-up the Indian Navy in times of war.

A designation of leadership roles has paralleled ICG’s growth and maturation. The director general of ICG heads the Offshore Security Coordination Committee (OSCC). The committee, established by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, is responsible for the “implementation of security policies, threat assessment and task assignment, preparing contingency plans and executing them when necessary for offshore security.” 

The director general also heads the National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan (NOSDCP) and preparedness meeting. NOSDCP further designates the ICG as the competent national authority for oil spill response in Indian waters. ICG is also the National Maritime Search and Rescue Coordinating Authority (NMSARCA). This makes ICG responsible for the coordination and management of all SAR operations within Indian waters. Additionally, ICG also serves as the Lead Intelligence Agency (LIA) for coastal and sea borders. As LIA, ICG collects and shares intelligence with other agencies as well as the central and state governments. ICG has also taken the lead in protecting the endangered Olive Ridley turtles by initiating Operation Olivia in 1991. ICG patrols the cordoned area and prevents intrusions and hunting.

The post 26/11-security landscape has necessitated several reforms for ICG. In the days since, it has increased patrolling shallow coastal waters, particularly near Mumbai and Gujarat. To assist in surveillance capabilities, it is in the process of installing a series of radars throughout coasts in India. It has also expanded its presence onshore and offshore by procuring new ships and aircraft as well as establishing new coast guard stations, with plans to increase both. In conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Shipping, it is in the process of providing biometric ID cards for fishermen and tracking devices and RFID tags for boats and ships. ICG, working together with state governments, Union territories, and other agencies, is also currently formulating the Coastal Security Scheme Phase-II (CSSP-II), an integrated coastal security plan that aims to plug in holes revealed by 26/11.

ICG is expected to continue its expansion program initiated in the wake of 26/11. The Rs. 2771.21 crore ($498.4 million USD) 2012-2013 budget is stipulated not only for administrative and maintenance expenses (salaries, overhead, equipment, etc.) but also for the acquisition of new ships, aircraft, and weapons. ICG is expected to procure 12 ships and 10 aircraft as well as open new stations in 2012. In response to a manpower shortage, ICG has sanctioned 4,000 new posts. It intends to fill up not only the existing vacancies but also some of these newly sanctioned posts by the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, ICG is also in the process of establishing a network of coastal radar stations. In April 2012, the Cabinet Committee on Security approved Rs. 1,800 crore ($331 million USD) to procure six offshore patrol vehicles. Expanding on the expansion plans, Inspector General Satya Prakash Sharma, commander of Coast Guard Region (East) has stated that orders for 156 ships and 52 aircrafts have been placed for the next five years.

Scathing Comptroller and Auditor General Audit

In August 2011, the comptroller and auditor general (CAG) issued a scathing report (Report No. 7 of 2011-12 for the period ending March 2010 - Performance Audit of Role and Functioning of Indian Coast Guard), which severely criticized ICG for its persistent inability, almost three years after 26/11, to protect Indian shores. Laying out a long list of operational and administrative problems plaguing ICG, the report concluded: “In an era of heightened coastal security concerns, ICG remains ill equipped to discharge its enhanced role and meet the challenges of today.” Addressing post 26/11 responses, the report observed that “response of ICG and Government has been ad hoc,” hinting that much needed comprehensive measures needed to be implemented. Taking a shot at the Ministry of Defense, the report noted that “given the legal limitations that the ICG works under in terms of enforcement of statutory acts and operational restrictions like the absence of identification and tracking systems for vessels, ICG activities for coastal security remain largely reactive.”

Criticizing the overall policy planning process and framework under which ICG operates, the report noted that ICG “is still operating with the 15 year Perspective Plan for 1985-2000 prepared in 1987 as subsequent Perspective Plans, i.e. 2002-17 and 2007-22, have not been approved by the Government.” Further, it criticized the five-year development plans as “unrealistic and unachievable.” It blamed “flawed planning and deficient execution” for ICG operating at about half of it required strength. Assessing the acquisition and procurement, the report stated that “not a single acquisition fructified in the 10^th plan period (2002-07), against the planned targets.” It also highlighted that “sanctioned/ activated stations continue to function with infrastructural/fleet deficiencies.” Some of the other major problems highlighted by the report include:

• Insufficient and inadequate assets and absence of vital communication equipment
• Limited night patrolling ability due to a lack of required equipment
• Ineffective inter-agency communication and coordination
• Lack of timely repair and maintenance
• Poor information management system
• Inability to carry out statutory duties such as environmental protection due to lack of resources as well as legislative backing
• Significant shortage of manpower

Worse yet, the report indirectly implicated ICG in the failure to stop the 26/11 attacks. It stated that in the period leading up to 26/11, ICG was not “involved in the inner layer operations in Maharashtra due to manpower and resource constraints.” ICG did not do any boarding operations in the days preceding the attacks. One reporter bluntly stated: “In effect this means: had the coast guard done an honest job, the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai might not have happened.” CAG hinted that ICG officials had tried to deliberately mislead them: “Poor internal controls also led audit to conclude that the actual number of boarding operations carried out by the coast guard ships was less than the figures furnished by the headquarters.” Translated this meant that ICG attempted to pass off more projected operations than it actually undertook.

Report No. - 7  of 2011-12 for the Period Ended March 2010 - Performance Audit of Role and Functioning of Indian Coast guard (Comptroller and Auditor General of India)

Coast Guard Operating Outdated Vessels: CAG (IBNLive)

Turf war with Navy has Cost Coast Guard: CAG (Deccan Herald)

CAG Report Exposes Gaping Holes in Coast Guard’s Operations and Maritime Preparedness (Defence Now)

Indian Coast Guard Ill-prepared to Deal with Threat from the Seas: CAG

Coast Guard Played with Figures to Hide 26/11 Security Failure (by Pradip Sagar and Saikat Dutta, Daily News & Analysis)

Report of the Standing Committee on Defense, Lok Sabha

In December 2011, the Standing Committee on Defense in the 15^th Lok Sabha presented a report titled Performance of Coast Guard Organization. After thoroughly analyzing the Coast Guard’s capabilities and performance, it recommended specific measures to improve operational efficiency. These were:

• Operate within a relevant policy framework and to take full advantage of the budgetary allocation, the Coast Guard Perspective Plan 2012-2027 should be completed in the prescribed time frame.
• Modernization of the Coastal Security Scheme Phase I should be completed as soon as possible. Further, monitoring and tracking systems / transponders should be fitted in all vessels identified for such installation as soon as possible
• An “all out effort” should be made to fill up manpower shortages as well as infrastructure shortages – weapons, surveillance and surface platforms, equipment, vessels, etc.
• As the lead intelligence agency for maritime and coastal borders, ICG should work with different stakeholders (ministries, central and state intelligence agencies, local populations) to create mechanisms that assist the organization to receive, collect, and disseminate intelligence.
• ICG should work in greater cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture as well as state governments to ensure that biometric ID cards are handed out to all fishermen in a timely manner.
• Owing to Orissa and West Bengal’s geo-strategic location, ICG should set up a Regional Headquarter (North-East) at Kolkata to effectively control the area.

ICG should work with related organizations to better prepare itself for natural disaster response and recovery efforts.

Radar Installation and Diesel Power Generation Station in Andaman and Nicobar Islands

As part of its post 26/11 modernization, ICG plans to install a series of radar stations throughout the coasts as well as India’s island territories. Plans have been drawn up to put 36 of these stations on the Indian mainland, six in Lakshadweep and Minicoy islands, and four in Andaman and Nicobar islands. The stations will assist the force in surveillance and reconnaissance of suspected vessels as well as those of interest. In accordance with environmental regulations, the Coast Guard recently submitted a proposal to build a radar station and a diesel power generation station to the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife. The plan includes clearing trees, constructing a road, and significantly increasing human presence in the area. The proposal has caused concern among environmentalists who fear that the construction jeopardizes the less than 350 endangered Narcondam Horbill birds endemic to Narcondam Island.

The Location for the Station Should be Approved

This position is espoused by the ICG. The justification for this project stems only from the station’s importance for “defense and national security” purposes. ICG’s proposal explains this rationale:

Narcondam Island is located at strategically important location. Poachers and intruders often frequent the area. Therefore, continuous maritime domain awareness is necessary to ensure security of the area.

The Standing Committee noted that the project was related to national security.

The Location for the Station Should Not be Approved

ICG’s proposal has resulted in a strong backlash from environmentalists. Conservation India warns that the proposed project has “high potential for chronic and increased disturbance to this lushly forested island and its small hornbill population.” It points out that the project will entail increased human habitation, an introduction of new pathogens potentially harmful to the hornbill, increased dependency on a single source of freshwater, deforestation, and drain on resources. All of these factors have the potential to hurt the hornbill population, the only such community of these hornbills in the world.

Dr. Asad Rahmani of the Bombay National History Society visited the site in February 2012 and advocated a rejection of the proposal. In a letter to Mrs. Jayanthi Natarajan, Minister of State for Environment & Forests (MOEF) and the Chairperson of the Standing Committee, a group of wildlife scientists bluntly stated that the “proposed installations at Narcondam Island are an extremely serious threat to the fragile island ecosystem and its endangered endemic hornbill species.” The letter further called for the proposal to be “firmly rejected.”

Birders Worried about the Tiny Narcondam Hornbill Population (by Jayashree Nandi, Times of India)

Rare Narcondam Hornbill Under Threat – Immediate Action Required (Conservation International)

Letter to Smt Jayanthi Natarajan (Nature Conservation Foundation)

Island In Peril: Conservation Caveats (by T.R. Shankar Raman and Divya Mudappa, The Hindu)

Government Plans Threaten 2 Unique Species (by Cara Tejpal, Tehelka)

World's only 300 Narcondam Hornbills Threatened by Radar Facility off India (Mongabay.com)

Anil Chopra

Vice Admiral Anil Chopra, the current Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command, served as the previous DG of ICG from December 2008 to October 2011.

A graduate of the National Defense Academy, Defense Services Staff College, College of Naval Warfare, and the National Defense College, Chopra was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1975.

His Flag Rank officer appointments include Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command; Assistant Controller of Carrier Projects; and Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy and Plans). Some of his more junior prominent appointments include Principal Director of Naval Plans; Chief Staff Officer (Operations), Eastern Naval Command; Naval Assistant to the Chief of Naval Staff; and Senior Instructor at the Defense Services Staff College.

Chopra was also a Senior Fellow at the United States Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Prior to his appointment as DC, ICG, he served as the Flag Officer Commanding, Western Fleet.