Known as “Friends of the Hill People” and “the Sentinels of the Northeast,” the Assam Rifles (AR) is one of the seven Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) under the authority of the Union Ministry for Home Affairs. Its establishment in 1835 makes it the oldest CMPF in India. AR is tasked with the protection of the Indo-Myanmar border as well as general internal security duties in the Northeast, with most battalions heavily deployed in the “tribal belt” area. Along with the Indian Army, and to a certain extent the Central Reserve Police Force, AR plays a central role in countering secessionist movements and insurgency in the Northeast. While Home Affairs exercises administrative control, the Indian Army, under the Ministry of Defense, exercises operational control over AR’s 46 battalions. The officer cadre of the Assam Rifles almost completely consists of active duty Indian Army officers. As a result, the force has been a focal point of a larger turf battle between Home Affairs and Defense. AR’s record, while commendable, is tarnished by human rights violations as well as corruption and complicity in criminal activities, particularly smuggling.

Assam Rifles (AR) began as the Cachar Levy, a quasi-military entity with 750 members under the command of Mr. Grange, a British civil officer in charge of the Nowgong district, Assam.  Led primarily by civilians, the Levy was responsible for law and order maintenance in the tribe dominated hills, infrastructure protection (mainly tea plantations), and frontier defense. In addition to the Cachar Levy, the British raised more levies, and along with the Army and state police, used them for frontier protection.

The first of many re-designations and restructurings came in 1863 when Cachar Levy was reorganized and replaced by a frontier military police. In 1883, the British moved to exempt the Army from policing duties and looked to the frontier military police to fill the gap. Cachar Levy was renamed the Assam Frontier Police and assumed internal policing as well frontier protection duties. To make it more efficient, the Assam Frontier Police transformed itself into a military police organization. Battalions were restructured, military ranks were adopted, and Indian Army officers were deputed to lead. To reflect these changes, it was renamed the Assam Military Police in 1891. For administrative purposes, the British formed the new province of East Bengal and Assam in 1905. This move led to a subsequent name change: the East Bengal and Assam Military Police. In 1912, upon the separation of East Bengal and Assam, the force reverted back to being called the Assam Military Police. Finally, in 1917, as a result of its performance in World War I, the force officially became the Assam Rifles.

The initial role of AR was internal security specific. In addition to its infrastructure, frontier protection and law and order maintenance roles, AR assisted local police units in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland during times of unrest and disorder. Despite being labeled a military force in 1891, AR’s initially focused on policing. Up until 1915, it consisted of three battalions (the fourth was formed in 1915 in Imphal, Manipur).

During World War I, more than 3,000 AR personnel were deployed as part of the British contingent in Europe and Middle East. This was the first time the force served in a combat capacity. After the war, one more battalion was added. For most of World War II, the force remained uninvolved in British war efforts in Europe. However, the growing Japanese threat in Burma and the possibility of a Japanese invasion of India necessitated the full employment of AR. Unlike WWI, when it was used only for combat, WWII saw an expansion in AR’s role with the force delegated a multitude of responsibilities. Perhaps the most celebrated of these was its involvement in Plan No. V, a secret blueprint to create a guerilla force for reconnaissance and combat missions behind enemy lines in Burma. The unit called ‘V’ Force consisted of personnel from the third and fourth battalions. ‘V’ Force was a success; its actions resulted in the acquisition of intelligence and obstructed Japanese advances. Other AR units saw action alongside British and Indian troops. Additionally, AR was also involved in the evacuation and management of Burmese refugees.

After the end of WWII in 1945, but before independence in 1947, AR was combined with the civil police headed by the Assam Inspector General of Police. Following independence, this arrangement was reversed and AR was granted its own inspector general. Further expansion of the force, its strategic deployment location, and a growing Chinese threat placed the force under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs as part of the North Eastern Frontier Agency. However, AR came under the administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs after 1965, while the Indian Army maintained operational control. This arrangement is maintained today.

Since independence, the role and profile of AR has continued to grow. It has been involved in a number of internal security and combat operations, including fighting Pakistani Irregulars in Tripura in 1947, handling political unrest in Nagaland in the 1950s, fighting the Chinese in the 1962 Indo-Sino War, filling in for regular Army in the Northeast during the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, and performing counter insurgency duties in Kashmir. AR had the distinct honor of welcoming and escorting the Dalai Lama as he fled Tibet for India in 1959. AR has also been deployed to Sri Lanka as part of a peacekeeping mission.

Counterinsurgency:

Counterinsurgency in the Northeast constitutes one of the most important duties of the Assam Rifles. Of its 46 battalions, 31 are involved in counterinsurgency. The strategic importance of the region coupled with the wide ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity in India has led the federal government to curb autonomy and secessionist movements to prevent these developments from spreading to other parts of the country. In many ways, AR is fundamentally better suited for counterinsurgency in the Northeast than any other CPMF. More than 90% of its officers are army-trained and more than 30% of the recruits are from the Northeast, which gives it considerable cultural, linguistic and other advantages. Furthermore, the AR appears to be involved in different facets of counterinsurgency. Unlike the Border Security Force in Jammu and Kashmir and the Central Reserve Police Force in states affected by left wing extremists, AR is not just focused on the military portion of counterinsurgency. It is actively involved in a plethora of civil affairs projects as well.

Border Protection:

The protection of the 1,643 km Indo-Myanmar border, alongside counterinsurgency, is one of the primary tasks of the Assam Rifles. Fifteen battalions perform border protection duties in Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland. Prior to the creation of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, AR was also in charge of guarding the Indo-China border. The border protection role primarily involves dealing with Indian insurgent and extremist groups, like the United Liberation Front for Asom (ULFA), the People’s Liberation Army, and the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) that use Myanmar as a training base and launching pad for attacks inside India. Additionally, AR also intercepts drug, arms, and rare-stones smugglers.

Civil Affairs:

Civil affairs programs, as part of AR’s “Winning Hearts and Minds” operations under the aegis of its Military Civic Action Project, are a cornerstone of the force’s overall strategy to counter socio-economic causes of insurgencies. AR conducts numerous activities designed to assist locals in neglected areas. AR’s wide ranging assistance includes educational camps, medical camps, rescue and relief, infrastructure construction, veterinary camps, community beautification programs, organization and coordination of recreational activities, provision of materials including computers, furniture, sports items, farm equipment, food, and water, and employment assistance, either directly or indirectly. AR’s policy of recruiting locals has alleviated unemployment conditions in the areas as well. Due to its deployment in mostly state-neglected areas, AR is sometimes the face of the government for local people. AR earmarks portions of its budget for Military Civic Action projects. As an example, in 2008, then Director General Lieutenant General Parmajit Singh AVSM, VSM, allocated Rs. 3.9 crore ($761,000) for civil affairs related projects aimed at youth development.

Additionally, AR provides miscellaneous related services, such as security protection during elections, important events, and VIP and VVIP visits to the area, plus infrastructure protection, disaster management, rescue and relief operations, and other tasks.

AR’s allocated Rs. 2,966.55 crore ($579.18 million USD) 2012-2013 budget saw an increase over the 2011-2012 Rs. 2543.88 ($497 million USD) budget. The increase likely reflects AR’s plan to raise 26 new battalions, in addition to maintaining the 46 it already has. Most of AR’s funds are spent on general upkeep and acquisition of new equipment. The force is also trying to expand jurisdiction over lands closer to the Indo-Myanmar border. In addition, a portion of the budget is earmarked for civil action projects.

Human Rights Violations

The Assam Rifles, like its counterparts in the central security forces, has a tarnished reputation as a result of gross human rights and civil liberties violations. Backed by the Armed Forces Special Protection Act (AFSPA), which effectively protects any and all actions of the soldiers in the Northeast, AR troops have engaged in murder, rape, thievery, smuggling, extrajudicial detentions, torture, land confiscation, and other egregious actions. Perhaps no case demonstrates this better than the rape, torture, and murder of Thangjam Manorama on July 11, 2004. Security forces picked up Manorama in the middle of the night and left her body lying on a road near a village. The body showed signs of severe physical and sexual torture. AR officials claimed Manorama was shot while trying to escape from an AR vehicle. Initial investigation and prosecution was blocked by AR on the grounds that state governments cannot consider such actions under the AFSPA statutes. As of March 2012, no concrete action had been taken against the alleged perpetrators. Manorama’s story, however, is not unique. Extrajudicial and custodial killings are commonplace, and security forces act with total impunity. Despite widespread allegations, only one case has been proven in the last nine years.

Manipur & Its Search for Elusive Justice (by Meenakshi Ganguly, Human Rights Watch)

Arrested Woman Found Brutally Killed (Sangai Express)

Militarization and Impunity in Manipur (by Jiten Yumnam and Phulindro Konsam, Committee on Human Rights)

Assam Rifles under Fire for Killing an Innocent Bamboo Cutter (by Ratnadip Choudhury, Tehelka)

1 Proven Rights Violation Case by Assam Rifles in 9 Yrs (Outlook India)

Army Hand in Heist, Say Cops (by Special Correspondent, The Telegraph)

Human Rights Violations in Assam (Assam.org)

Timber Smuggling

While anti-smuggling efforts are supposed to be a key component of AR’s border protection duties, some personnel have been accused of smuggling teakwood. In late 2011, it was revealed that some higher-ranking officers used five civilian trucks to smuggle teak from Moreh, Manipur to somewhere near Shillong, Meghalaya. These trucks were escorted by AR personnel and trucks. A leak to the inspector general resulted in the apprehension of the trucks. It was revealed that a Staff Officer 1 of the Director General’s office was leading the smuggling operation. This incident raised questions about the extent to which AR personnel were involved in smuggling, not just teak but also arms, drugs and rare jewels. Curbing smuggling is a top priority within the region as forests are coming under increasing threat from this menace.

Smugglers Plundering Teak from Kulshi Forest (by Correspondent, Assam Tribune)

Teak Forests of West Kamrup Division under Threat (by Kishore Talukdar, Assam Tribune)

DGAR Trucks Allegedly Involved in Teak Smuggling (Hueiyen News Service)

More Focus on the Indo-Myanmar Zero Line:

One of the primary reasons the Ministry of Home Affairs wants to deploy Border Security Force on the Indo-Myanmar border is because AR posts are situated well inside Indian borders. This gap affords insurgents, smugglers, and other elements an opportunity to sneak in and out of India undetected. With the Chinese threat looming in the background, AR needs to focus more on border protection. While the Home Ministry has allocated Rs. 22 crore ($4.3 million) in 2012-2013 for Indo-Myanmar border works, AR also needs to devise a strategy to move closer to the border. Only 15 out of 46 battalions are engaged in protection the 1,600 km+ border. The raising of 26 additional battalions is a step in the right direction. However, more needs to be done.

Assam Rifles or Border Security Force for Indo-Myanmar Border:

As entities charged with the physical protection of India, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Defense regularly engage in bureaucratic turf battles. Home Affairs is responsible for internal security, while Defense is responsible for external threats. However, in India’s dynamic internal security environment, there is no clear distinction. One of the more recent turf battles involves a desire of the Home Ministry to replace the Assam Rifles with the Border Security Force (BSF) for guarding the Indo-Myanmar border. The matter has been debated in the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Assam Rifles should be replaced by the Border Security Force:

This position is espoused by the Home Ministry, which exercises administrative control over AR. The ministry’s desire is to move toward the ‘one border-one force’ recommendation in the aftermath of the Kargil War. A task force on border management and the Group of Ministers report on improving national security recommended that one force alone be responsible for protection along India’s borders with six other nations. Currently, there are four forces involved in this task. The ministry believes that the dual tasks of counter-insurgency and border protection affect AR’s ability to effectively carry out either task. Most of AR’s posts are located well inside Indian territory, which makes it difficult for it to man the 1,600 km+ border. Home Ministry wants AR to pull back its posts and focus exclusively on counterinsurgency, while the Border Security Force focuses on border protection.

Assam Rifles should not be replaced by the Border Security Force:

This position is espoused by the Army (under the control of the Ministry of Defense), which exercises operational control over the AR. The Army’s position is based on the argument that moving AR away from the border would result in the loss of expertise and experience that BSF will find difficult to achieve quickly. The Army argues that with over 90% of the officers deputed from the Army and over 30% of troops recruited from the local area, AR is distinctly capable of conducting both border protection as well counterinsurgency operations. The major concern for the Army is China’s growing encroachment into and military relationship with Myanmar. Chinese infrastructure projects built near the Indo-Myanmar border give it surveillance advantages.

Turf Wars Make One Border-One Force Theory Non-Starter (by Rajat Pandit, Times of India)

One Border, One Force - A Concept Whose Time Has Arrived (by Guest Writer, DefenceInfo.com)

BSF Keen on Guarding Indo-Myanmar Border: DG (by PTI, Moneycontrol.com)

Proposal to Deploy BSF along India-Myanmar Border (by PTI, ZeeNews)

Why Replace the Assam Rifles along the Indo-Myanmar Border? (by Shivananda H, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis)

Rameshwar Roy

Lieutenant General Rameshwar Roy, UVSM, AVSM, and YSM, was the 26th director general of the Assam Rifles before his dismissal over allegations of financial misappropriation. He led the AR from January 2010 to February 2012. Documents revealed Roy’s wife billed personal expenses as official expenditures, and that the general received reimbursements for these expenses.

He was commissioned as an Army officer in 1973 in the seventh battalion of J&K Rifles. Educated at the Defense Services Staff College and the Higher Command Course, he previously served on the Brigadier General Staff in the Eastern Sector.