Established in 1963 as the Special Services Bureau, Sashastra Seem Bal (SSB) is one of the central paramilitary forces under the control of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. As a border guarding force, SSB is responsible for the protection of the 1,751 km Indo-Nepal and 699 km Indo-Bhutan borders. While the Indo-Bhutan border is relatively peaceful, the Indo-Nepal border has seen an increase in smuggling of goods and humans and serves as an entry point for “anti-national” elements – militants belonging to banned groups as well spies and smugglers – and as a result, the bulk of SSB’s focus is in this area. Additionally, unresolved border disputes between Nepal and India also make this border strategically important. While it is indeed a necessary force for providing external and internal security, SSB’s image has been tainted by accusations of its involvement in smuggling as well as alleged encroachment and subsequent human rights violations.

India’s defeat in the 1962 Indo-China War was the impetus for the establishment of the Special Services Bureau. The war revealed that border populations were marginalized, had no real contact with the Indian homeland, felt culturally, politically, and economically alienated, and were apathetic toward either Indian or Chinese presence on their soil. The lack of effective central or state government administration led to confusion during the time of war. Moreover, it was revealed that during the war, the population made no active efforts to resist Chinese occupation.

In light of this, the Indian government decided to create a unique organization tasked with overcoming these obstacles. This led to the creation of SSB under the control of the Directorate General of Security in the Cabinet Secretariat. Lacking a separate legislative backing, SSB, until the passage of the Sashastra Seema Bal Act in 2007, was governed by specific provision of the Central Reserve Police Forces Act. 1949. The “Bureau” was initially conceived as an unconventional organization assigned the task of physically and mentally preparing border area populations, especially in the Northeast, for any subsequent wars or invasions. The Bureau’s initial area of operations included the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, North Bengal, and parts (especially hills) of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Ladakh in J&K. The area of operations was gradually expanded to include Manipur, Tripura, Jammu, Meghalaya, Sikkim, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Bengal. The Bureau duties in those states from 1963 to 2001 can be identified as:

• Inculcating a sense of security and spirit of resistance amongst people living in the border areas.
• Generating mass support in the border areas through National Integration Programs and welfare activities.
• Organizing and preparing border population to resist foreign enemy and perform “Stay Behind” role during future invasion/occupation.
• Winning the hearts and minds of people by making the benign presence of government felt through welfare, development, cultural and other activities, and civil action programs.

While the Bureau’s activities did include weapons and survival training for civilians, most of its work was concentrated on civic action programs. Central government wanted residents of these areas to feel a “sense of national belonging” and decided to achieve this via programs aimed at improving the lives of the citizens. These programs included infrastructure development, job creation, educational initiatives, and healthcare projects. In addition to its welfare and civil action programs, the other important role of the Bureau was its stay-behind role. In the event of another war or invasion, SSB personnel were tasked with counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare.

As time progressed, however, and the nature of the Chinese security threat began to change, a committee was set up to study the appropriateness of the force’s role and recommend changes. Realizing that another war with China was unlikely (and improved capabilities of the Indian armed forces under the Ministry of Defense), the Committee of Secretaries in 1986 was recommended that the ‘stay behind’ be deemphasized and more emphasis be placed on SSB’s efforts to bring citizens of farther territories into the national mainstream. The rise of insurgency in northeastern states coupled with the ineffectiveness and inability of state governments to deal with these problems only made this emphasis more urgent.

In 1997, a three-member committee that included Kalyan K Mitra, then Principal Director at the Directorate General of Security in the Cabinet Secretariat, set to define SSB’s role. While no longer an immediate military threat, the committee recognized that China as a long term security threat and advised that SSB continue its efforts in the region. Following the Kargil War in 1999, the Group of Ministers Report: Reforming the National Security System recommended that the Indo-Tibetan Border Police guard the Indo-Nepal border. Mitra’s committee recommended that SSB be placed in charge of the Indo-Nepal border. The recommendation was accepted, and on January 15 2001, administrative and operation control of the SSB was transferred to the Home Ministry. On June 19, 2001, the force began protecting the Indo-Nepal border. On June 29, 2001, SSB was declared the Lead Intelligence Agency for the Indo-Nepal border. In December 2003, SSB’s name was officially changed to Sashastra Seema Bal. The force’s role was expanded on March 12, 2004 when it was assigned the Indo-Bhutan border. The force was also presented the President’s Colors in March 2004.

Taking into account the expansion of the force and its duties, the government felt that it was necessary for such a force to have specific provisions and legal backing. The Sashastra Seema Bal Act was passed in 2007 for these reasons.

Headquartered in New Delhi, SSB’s about 60,000 personnel are led by an IPS cadre Director General.  The headquarters in Delhi command the Frontier Headquarters (led an Inspector General), which in turn oversee the Sector Headquarters (led by a Deputy Inspector General) that oversee the stationed battalions. SSB Frontier Headquarters are located in Ranikhet (which oversees the Pithoragarh and Pilibhit Sector HQs); Lucknow (which oversees the Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur Sectors HQs); Patna (which oversees the Muzaffarpur and Purnea Sector HQs); Kolkata (which oversees the Ranidanga, Gangtok, and New Jalpaiguri Sector HQs); and Guwahati (which oversees the Bongaingaon and Tezpur Sector HQs).

Since its transfer to the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2001, the primary role of the SSB has shifted to border protection. The Indo-Nepal border extends along the states of Uttaranchal (264 km), Uttar Pradesh (600 km), Bihar (800 km), West Bengal (105 km), and Sikkim (99 km). The Indo-Bhutan border runs across Sikkim (32 km), West Bengal (183 km), Assam (267 km), and Arunachal Pradesh (217 km). 25 battalions of SSB are deployed at the Indo-Nepal border which has 450 Border Out-Posts (BOPs) and 13 battalions of SSB are deployed at the 131 BOPs across the Indo-Bhutan border. Broadly, this role requires SSB

• to promote sense of security among the people living in the border area.
• to prevent trans-border crimes and unauthorized entries into or exit from the territory of India.
• to prevent smuggling and other illegal activities.

One of the primary problems along both borders is its use by anti-national elements, particularly insurgents, to enter and exit India. Along the Indo-Nepal border, operations are run by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Chinese intelligence as well Northeastern insurgent groups. As an example “terrorist outfits like LeT, Indian Mujahideen and some insurgent groups from Northeastern part of India have been using the open border to provide logistical support (supply of trained cadres, fake Indian currency, and terror finance by using Nepalese banks, dispersal of small arms and explosives and narcotics) to their clandestine operations in India.” The Indo-Bhutan border is used by left wing and communist entities. Reports have suggested that insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFA) and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) have increased co-operation with the Bhutan Tiger Force, the Bhutan Maoist Party and the Communist Party of Bhutan.” Further pressure on the Indo-Bhutan border has also occurred as a result of Bangladeshi crackdown on insurgent groups in its territory.

The porous nature of the borders that allows insurgents and other to slip by has also attracted smugglers. An SSB official observed: Both the borders are sensitive and frequented by militants and smugglers.” Smuggling and as a result anti-smuggling operations have increased in intensity. Smuggled goods include alcohol, currency, animal skin and parts, drugs, timber, weapons, cement, sugar, rice, petroleum, etc. In this regard, the Indo-Nepal border in particular is a problem. The border is an open and unrestricted requiring no visas or special permissions. The negative implications of this practice – border encroachment, cross-border terrorism, human, weapons, drugs, and goods trafficking, cross border crimes, and kidnapping – all create unique challenges for SSB.

As the Lead Intelligence Agency for both borders, SSB is also responsible for the coordination and dissemination of intelligence from its area of operations as well as cooperation with state and central intelligence and enforcement agencies. Like all force under the control of the Home Ministry, SSB has not been immune to ad-hoc usage. SSB battalions have been deployed for counterinsurgency and internal security duties in Assam and other states and personnel have also been deployed abroad as part of the Indian contingent for UN missions. SSB personnel were also deployed for election duties in Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Assam, Kerala, and Pondicherry.

SSB is currently in the process of raising an additional 15 battalions. As a result, it is expected a good portion of SSB’s budget will be devoted to this need. While SSB does not disclose its full budget, given its activities most of its budget is undoubtedly geared toward the maintenance of its forces – salaries, equipment, administrative costs, etc.

The “Soft” Indo-Nepalese Border

Smuggling is rampant throughout the Indo-Nepal border. Despite SSB’s stepped up efforts to counter this menace, smuggling has only continued to increase. While the porous borders and lax attitudes are to blame, SSB is also at fault. It is a well-known fact that SSB personnel are complicit in smuggling activities and actively render help to smugglers and participate in the intimidation of locals. The extent of this, however, is unknown. A Tehelka report on sugarcane smuggling in Bihar noted that “smuggling continues despite the presence of SSB guards along the “soft border.” It further states: “More than the farmers, it is the factory owners, the police, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) personnel guarding the Indo-Nepal border …who have benefited from the clandestine trade in sugarcane.” Farmers interview alleged that “truckloads of treacle and molasses produced by the crushers are smuggled into Bangladesh via Nepal through the Indo-Nepal border, giving the crusher owners a good profit. SSB personnel get handsome bribes in the bargain.” A Bihar Times article pointed out that local villagers living along the Indo-Nepal  border in Bihar alleged that SSB personnel are involved in smuggling of a great variety of items and that “they also harass the villagers if they resist their activities.”

Sharp Rise in Smuggling of Contraband Items from Nepal (Bihar Times)

Bihar's Bitter Harvest (by Anand ST Das, Tehelka.Com)

Smuggled Nepalese Goods Flood Bihar (by Alok Mishra, Times of India)

Panthers at Receiving End as Poachers, Smugglers Have Field Day (by Jagdish Bhatt, Hill Post)

Five Districts Bordering Nepal Safe Haven For Smugglers (by Bhupendra Pandey, Express India)

Smuggling of Musk Deer Organs Being Done On Indo-Nepal Border (Times of India)

SSB Should be Part of a more coherent Border Guarding Force

SSB’s border guarding duties came about as a recommendation of the Group of Ministers Report. Perhaps recognizing that forces will be used as pleased and not in exact accordance with their mandate and training, the Report warned that, “It is imperative that the Border Guarding Forces are not deployed in the States to deal with internal disturbances, law and order duties and counter insurgency operation.” While SSB, for the most part, has primarily focused on border protection and associated duties, it has been used by the central government to make up for a shortage of manpower in sensitive and non sensitive regions. This abuse of central paramilitary forces has resulted in calls for reforming the structure of forces under the control of the Home Ministry. Two proposals, both of which focus on reducing the number of responsible agencies and thereby simplifying security management, call for the development of either a single force responsible for Indian borders with all countries (with other forces responsible for internal security and infrastructure protection) or a border protection department within one single force (under the control of the Home Ministry). Proponents contend that in addition to simplifying management, either one of these arrangements also clearly delineates forces based on tasks and not geographical distribution.

India's Border Management: Select Documents (by Pushpa Das, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis)

Border management: Need for reform (by Gurmeet Kanwal, Rediff News)

Time to Merge Troops under Home Ministry (by Nitin Pai, Daily News & Analysis)

Consolidation of Paramilitary forces makes sense (by Bibhu Prasad Routray, The Sunday Standard)

Dang Incident (Indian Encroachment into Nepali Territory)

In June 2009, reports emerged from the Nepalese media that about 2,000 Nepalese citizens were driven out of their homes by SSB from 22 border villages in Dang District. The alleged action was decried as encroachment of Nepalese territory. Reports later indicated that the number displaced hovered around 6,000 people and alleged that SSB personnel engaged in torching of houses, abductions, rape, and other human rights violations. Reports also further stated such excesses were common from the Indian side.  

India isn’t Encroaching on Nepalese Land

Indian authorities quickly dismissed this claim and stated that no such thing had happened. The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu released a statement saying:

“The Embassy has crosschecked the factual situation with relevant Indian authorities. It has been clarified that there has been no violation of international border or any attacks upon Nepalese nationals by Indian border guard forces. It has also been confirmed that no border pillar has been shifted or tampered with. The Embassy would also like to point out that no formal communication has been received by it from the Government of Nepal regarding these alleged incidents. In response to queries from District authorities on the Indian side, their Nepalese counterparts have conveyed that no reports have been registered with them in this regard either.”

The Embassy categorically rejects, the allegations carried in some sections of the Nepalese media on the above mentioned incidents as baseless and motivated by vested interests in an attempt to vitiate the friendly and cordial relationship between India and Nepal.”

Indian Excesses Trigger Exodus (Kathmandu Post) (Pdf)

Thousands Displaced as Indian Forces Drive Nepali Families Out of Their Villages (Nepalnews.Com)

SSB Men Caught Removing Border Pillars (by Dil Bahadur Chhatyla, Republika)

Thousands of People Displaced by Actions of Indian Security Forces along the Border in Dang District (July 2009) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center)

India is encroaching on Nepalese Land

Nepali villagers and human rights advocates maintain that SSB personnel are removing border pillars and thereby facilitating “accidental” encroachment. Nepali villagers just on other side of the border say that “hundreds of bighas (6,772.63 sq. meters) of land has been encroached by Indian side in Kailali and Kanchanpur districts alone.” Indian authorities continue to deny this claim.

India Denies Attacks by Its Border Forces on Nepalis (Sulekha.Com)

IDSA Comment: Demarcate the India-Nepal Border (by Pushpita Das, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis)

Indian Embassy June 5, 2009 Press Release (Indian Embassy, Kathmandu)

Y S Dadwal

Y S Dadwal served as the director general of SSB from November of 2010 to November of 2011. Dadwal is a 1974 batch IPS officer from the Arunachal, Goa, and Union Territories cadre. He has previously served as the Delhi Police Commissioner and was credited with security arrangements during the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi. Prior to that, he had served as the Special Commissioner of Police, Delhi.